












































































































































































































             Abstract
In this paper we first explore the impact of nominal and real
persistence on the transmission process of various shocks in an
estimated DSGE model of euro area. We then analyse its impact on
optimal monetary policy and investigate the performance of various
monetary policies when the policy maker is uncertain about the degree
of nominal and real persistence.






In this paper we analyse the implications of structural inflation and output persistence for the
propagation of structural shocks and for optimal monetary policy using the Smets-Wouters (2003)
DSGE model of the euro area. The estimated model incorporates various structural persistence
mechanisms such as Calvo-type price and wage setting augmented by the assumption that those prices
and wages that cannot be freely set are partially linked to past prices, habit formation in consumption
and adjustment costs in investment. In order to illustrate the differences between nominal and real
persistence, we concentrate on the implications of inflation persistence due to the augmented price
setting model and of output persistence due to adjustment costs in investment.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We first analyse the implications of nominal and real persistence
for the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the propagation of various structural shocks. We
then use a standard welfare criterion in inflation, the output gap and changes in the short-term nominal
interest rate to analyse the effects of structural persistence on optimal monetary policy. To this end we
look at the efficiency frontiers and the optimal monetary policy responses to the various shocks under
both optimised simple rules and fully optimal policies under commitment. Finally, given the
uncertainty regarding both the conceptual underpinnings and the empirical importance of structural
persistence in inflation and output, we examine the robustness of optimal monetary policy in the
presence of uncertainty about the model’s relevant persistence parameters, looking again at both
optimised simple rules and optimal policies under commitment.
The findings of our analysis can be summarised as follows. First, we find that uncertainty about the
degree of output persistence presents much smaller problems for monetary policy-makers than
uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence. In particular, we find that optimised simple rules
appear to be relatively robust to different degrees of output persistence. By contrast, when there is
uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence, it is better for monetary policy-makers to work
on the assumption that the economy is characterised by a relatively high degree of inflation
persistence. The reason is that the cost of assuming a higher degree of inflation persistence than the
one prevailing in reality is not as high as the cost of making the opposite mistake. Second, while a
similar tendency is found for optimised simple rules and optimal commitment policies, we find that
the latter are generally more robust than the former, confirming Svensson’s (2002) conjecture that





As highlighted by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (2000) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001)
amongst others, the popular micro-founded New Keynesian DSGE model with nominal price and wage
staggering is not able to match the persistence and cross-correlations of the main macroeconomic time
series (and in particular output and inflation) very well. In order to improve the empirical fit, a number of
additional features that introduce structural persistence in the basic building blocks (price and wage
setting and consumption and investment decisions) of those models have been introduced.
1 These features
typically result in the introduction of lagged endogenous variables in the various Euler equations.
However, the importance of those backward-looking components has been subject to a heated debate both
on its theoretical foundations and on its empirical importance. From a theoretical point of view, it is not
always clear what the “micro-foundations” are of the structural persistence in inflation, wage,
consumption and investment equations. While references are often made to generalised adjustment costs,
the micro-economic evidence of the exact form of these adjustment costs is scant. Alternative
explanations refer to rule-of-thumb behaviour, formal or informal indexation and habit formation.
However, also here the evidence is not always clear cut.
2 From an empirical perspective there is a debate
about the importance of forward-looking behaviour in inflation, wages, consumption and investment. For
example, while some authors claim that the inflation process is dominated by backward-looking
components (e.g. Fuhrer, 1997), others have found that inflation follows a primarily forward-looking
process (e.g. Galí and Gertler, 1999). A review of some of the evidence for the United States can be found
in Rudebusch (2002). Similarly, while Cogley and Sargent (2001) have argued that there has been a
downward shift in the degree of persistence in the inflation process in the US suggesting that inflation
persistence is not necessarily structural, others (see Stock, 2001) have countered that the statistical
evidence in favour of such a break is weak.
3 
The degree of structural persistence in the process for inflation and output has potentially important
implications for optimal monetary policy. A number of authors have examined the robustness of policy
with respect to the degree of inflation persistence. However, also here there does not seem to be a
consensus regarding the implications. For example, Amato and Laubach (2002) conclude that the optimal
policy rule under commitment in the benchmark forward-looking model performs also quite well in more
backward-looking models. This finding is corroborated by Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b), who show
that introducing inflation persistence in the standard New Keynesian model introduces forward-looking
elements in the optimal policy rule. However, the weights on these forward-looking elements are quite
small. In contrast, Coenen (2002), who focuses on simple instrument rules, finds that it is better for the
                                                     
1  See, for example, Galí and Gertler (1999), Christiano et al. (2001), Amato and Laubach (2002) and Smets and Wouters
(2003).
2  For example, Amato and Laubach (2002) refer to micro-economic studies of consumption behaviour to argue in favour of
rule-of-thumb behaviour in consumption rather than habit formation.  
3  See also the cross-country evidence presented in Benati (2002) and Levin and Piger (2002).	
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monetary policy maker to assume that the economy is characterised by a relatively high degree of
persistence because the costs of making a mistake when the economy in reality is less persistent are not as
high as making the reverse mistake.
4  
In this paper, we revisit this issue using the DSGE model estimated for the euro area in Smets and
Wouters (2003) looking not only at nominal persistence, but also at real persistence. The model used
incorporates various structural persistence mechanisms such as price and wage indexation, habit
formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment. In order to illustrate the differences
between nominal and real persistence we concentrate on the implications of inflation persistence due to
price indexation on the one hand, and of output persistence due to adjustment costs in investment on the
other hand. The main features of the Smets-Wouters model are described in Section 2. We then proceed
in three steps. In Section 3, we first analyse the effects of different degrees of persistence on the dynamics
of the economy. We investigate the implications of structural nominal and real persistence for the
monetary policy transmission mechanism and the transmission of various structural shocks. Next, in
Section 4 we use a standard welfare criterion in inflation, the output gap and changes in interest rates, to
analyse the effects of structural persistence on optimal monetary policy. This is done by looking at the
efficiency frontiers and the optimal response of policy under commitment to the various shocks. Finally,
in Section 5 we examine the robustness of policy in the presence of uncertainty about the degree of
structural persistence, looking again at both simple policy rules and optimal policy under commitment.  
2.  The Smets-Wouters euro area (SWEAR) model 
In this section we briefly describe the estimated model for the euro area that we will use in the subsequent
analysis.
5 The model is an extended version of the standard New-Keynesian DSGE closed-economy
model with sticky prices and wages as, for example, analysed in Erceg et al. (2001). Households
maximise a utility function with two arguments (goods and leisure) over an infinite life horizon.
Consumption appears in the utility function relative to a time-varying external habit variable.
6 Labour is
differentiated over households, so that there is some monopoly power over wages which results in an
explicit wage equation and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal wages à la Calvo (see Calvo,
1983). Households also rent capital services to firms and decide how much capital to accumulate given
certain capital adjustment costs. As the rental price of capital goes up, the capital stock can be used more
intensively according to some cost schedule. Firms produce differentiated goods, decide on labour and
capital inputs, and set prices, again according to the Calvo model. The Calvo model in both wage and
price setting is augmented by the assumption that those prices and wages that can not be freely set are
partially indexed to past prices. Prices are therefore set as a function of current and expected marginal
                                                     
4  Coenen (2002) also analyses the cost of using inflation forecasts based on models with the wrong degree of inflation
persistence. 
5  A more complete derivation and description can be found in Smets and Wouters (2003).
6  Habit depends on lagged aggregate consumption which is unaffected by any one agent's decisions. Abel (1990) calls this the
"catching up with the Joneses" effect.  	
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costs, but are also determined by the past inflation rate. The marginal costs depend on wages and the
rental rate of capital. In what follows, we briefly describe the linearised version of the model,
emphasising the various persistence parameters that are of interest.
7 Variables dated t+1 correspond to the
expectation of that variable at time t+1 given information available at time t.

















































where  t C  is consumption,  t R  is the nominal short-term interest rate,  t   is inflation and  b
t   is a
temporary, but persistent shock to the consumer’s discount rate.  c   is the inverse of the intertemporal
degree of substitution. The parameter  c h  captures the degree of external habit formation in consumption
and lies between zero and one. When  0  c h , equation (1) reduces to the traditional forward-looking
consumption equation. With external habit formation, consumption depends on a weighted average of
past and expected future consumption. 
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where  t I  is investment,  t Q  is the value of capital and   is the inverse elasticity of the cost function of
changing investment. A negative shock to the adjustment cost function, 
I
t  , (also denoted as a positive
investment shock) temporarily increases investment. As discussed in Christiano et al. (2001), modelling
the capital adjustment costs as a function of the change in investment rather than its level introduces
additional dynamics in the investment equation, which is useful in capturing the hump-shaped response of
investment to various shocks including monetary policy shocks. In equation (2), we have generalised this
adjustment cost function. If  I h  is zero, then the adjustment costs only depend on current investment and
the investment process becomes completely forward-looking. If in contrast  I h  is one, then the investment
process becomes partly backward-looking with a weight on past investment of about one half.   is the
households’ discount rate.
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k r      ,   is the rate of depreciation and 
k r  is the steady-state rental rate on capital.
The current value of the capital stock depends negatively on the ex-ante real interest rate, and positively
on its expected future value and the expected rental rate. The introduction of a shock to the required rate
                                                     
7  Table A of the Appendix reports the estimated values of the parameters of the model. See Smets and Wouters (2003).	
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of return on equity investment,  Q
t  , is meant as a shortcut to capture changes in the cost of capital that
may be due to stochastic variations in the external finance premium.
8
The capital accumulation equation is standard:
(4) 1 1 ) 1 (      t t t I K K  
With partial indexation, the inflation equation becomes a more general specification of the standard New-
Keynesian Phillips curve:































   ) 1 (





Inflation depends on past and expected future inflation and the current marginal cost, which itself is a
function of the rental rate on capital ( k
t r ), the real wage ( t w ) and the productivity parameter ( a
t  ).
When the degree of inflation persistence is zero ( 0  p  ), this equation reverts to the standard purely
forward-looking Phillips curve. In other words, the parameter  p   determines how backward looking the
inflation process is. The elasticity of inflation with respect to changes in the marginal cost depends mainly
on the degree of price stickiness. When all prices are flexible ( 0  p  ) and the price-mark-up shock,  p
t  ,
is zero, this equation reduces to the normal condition that in a flexible price economy the real marginal
cost should equal one.
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where  t L  is labour. The real wage,  t w , is a function of expected and past real wages and the expected,
current and past inflation rate where the relative weight depends on the degree of indexation of the non-
optimised wages. When  0  w  , real wages do not depend on the lagged inflation rate. There is a
negative effect of the deviation of the actual real wage from the wage that would prevail in a flexible
labour market. The size of this effect will be greater, the smaller the degree of wage rigidity ( w  ), the
lower the demand elasticity for labour ( w  ) and the lower the inverse elasticity of labour supply ( L  )
(the flatter the labour supply curve). 
L
t   is a persistent labour supply shock, while 
w
t   is a temporary
wage mark-up shock.
                                                     
8  This is the only shock that is not directly related to the structure of the economy. For alternative interpretations of this equity
premium shock and an analysis of optimal monetary policy in the presence of such shocks, see Dupor (2001).	
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The equalisation of marginal cost implies that, for a given installed capital stock, labour demand depends
negatively on the real wage (with a unit elasticity) and positively on the rental rate of capital:
(7) 1 ) 1 (       t
k
t t t K r w L 
where  1  t K   is last period’s capital stock and   is the inverse of the elasticity of the capital utilisation
cost function.  
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where  y k  is the steady state capital-output ratio,  y g  the steady-state government spending-output ratio
and   is one plus the share of the fixed cost in production.  G
t  captures a government spending shock.
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The monetary policy-makers gradually respond to deviations of lagged inflation from a time-varying
inflation objective ( t  ) and to the output gap, defined as the difference between actual and potential
output (
p
t Y ). Consistent with the DSGE model, potential output is defined as the level of output that
would prevail under flexible prices and wages in the absence of the three “cost-push” shocks:  Q





t  . The parameter   captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, there is also a
short-run feedback from the current change in inflation and the output gap. Finally, in addition to the
persistent time-varying inflation objective, we also assume that there is a temporary interest rate shock
( R
t  ), which will also be denoted as a monetary policy shock.
Equations (1) to (9) determine the nine endogenous variables:  t,  t w ,  1  t K , Qt ,  t I ,  t C ,  t R ,  k
t r ,  t L
of our model. The stochastic behaviour of the system of linear rational expectations equations is driven by
ten exogenous shock variables: five shocks arising from technology and preferences ( a
t  ,  I
t  ,  b




t  ), three “cost-push” shocks ( w
t  , p
t   and  Q
t  ) and two monetary policy shocks ( t   and  R
t  ).
9 The
first set of shock variables is assumed to follow independent first-order autoregressive processes, whereas
the second set is assumed to be IID independent processes. The estimated autoregressive parameters and
standard deviations of these shocks are reported in Table A of the Appendix. 
The two parameters that are of particular interest in this paper are  p   and  I h , capturing the structural
persistence in the inflation and in the investment process respectively. Table A of the Appendix reveals
that the price indexation parameter is estimated to be around 0.46, implying that the weight on lagged
                                                     
9  In addition, we will also use a flexible price and wage version of the DSGE model in order to define a model-consistent
output gap. In what follows, the output gap is defined as the difference between the actual level of output under sticky prices
and wages and the level of output that would prevail under flexible prices and wages in the absence of distortionary equity-
premium, price and wage mark-up shocks.   	
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inflation in the inflation equation is only 0.28. This is quite consistent with the results in Galí, Gertler and
Lopez-Salido (2001). Following Smets and Wouters (2003), the parameter that captures the structural
persistence in investment is fixed at one, implying a coefficient on lagged investment in equation (2) of
about 0.5. 
3.  Nominal and real persistence and the propagation of shocks 
In this section we analyse the implications of changes in inflation and investment persistence for the
propagation of various shocks in the estimated euro area model discussed above. Charts 1 and 2 illustrate
how the economy responds to a monetary policy shock under various degrees of nominal and real
persistence when the monetary authorities follow the estimated policy rule. In each case, the persistence
parameter takes three values: a low value of 0.1, a medium value of 0.5 and a high value of 0.9.
A number of observations are worth making. As expected, higher inflation persistence amplifies and
prolongs the output and inflation effects of a monetary policy shock. It clearly delays the peak effect of a
policy shock on inflation, thereby producing a more pronounced hump-shaped response in inflation. It
also implies a larger peak effect of the policy shock on inflation (Chart 1). The effects of higher inflation
persistence on the response of the output gap are smaller: while the size of the peak effect on output
increases somewhat, the timing of the peak effect does not change very much.
10 Higher inflation
persistence also implies a much more persistent real interest rate response. 
In contrast, the effects of higher output persistence (as captured by a higher degree of investment
persistence) on the response of the output gap and inflation are much less pronounced (Chart 2). Higher
investment persistence delays the peak effect of a policy shock on output, but it does not appear to affect
the peak effect on inflation. Those peak effects increase somewhat (in absolute value) as the persistence
in investment increases, but the size of those effects is much smaller than in the case of higher inflation
persistence. 
These results are confirmed in Table 1, which reports the maximum size (and its timing in quarters
following the shock) of the effect of the various other shocks on inflation and the output gap. Higher
inflation persistence increases and delays the maximum response of inflation to the various shocks. As a
result, the output gap generally also responds more, but the timing of its peak is not much affected.
Consistent with the results for a monetary policy shock, higher output persistence generally delays the
maximum response of the output gap to the various shocks, but has little effect on the timing of the peak
response in inflation which is governed by the degree of inflation persistence. There is no clear effect on
the size of output gap and inflation responses. The relatively limited size effects of higher investment
persistence may be due to the fact that the share of investment in total output is relatively small and
consumption is not very much affected by shifts in the response of investment.  
                                                     
10  While the shift in the peak effect is common across different ways of introducing inflation persistence (e.g. rule-of-thumb
behaviour), the increase in the size of the peak effect is not. For example, Amato and Laubach (2002) show that increased
rule of thumb behaviour in their set-up reduces the sensitivity of inflation to marginal cost and therefore tends to reduce the
size of the inflation effects. 	
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4.  Structural persistence and optimal monetary policy 
In order to analyse the effects of structural persistence on optimal monetary policy, we use the following
standard quadratic loss function in deviations of inflation from a zero inflation target, the output gap and
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While this loss function does not necessarily fully capture the welfare of the representative consumer in
the estimated DSGE model, it is likely to be a close approximation for two reasons. First, the output gap
concept used in the loss function is consistent with the underlying structure of the model. Potential output
is defined as the output level that would prevail under flexible prices and wages in the absence of the
distortionary equity premium and price and wage mark-up shocks. As shown by Woodford (2001), in a
simple version of the estimated model, optimal policy can be characterised as closing the output gap
defined as such. Second, nominal price staggering creates costs of inflation, which can be captured by the
term in inflation. While it is true that this term may be modified when there is price and wage indexation
and when also nominal wages are rigid, the dominant weight will still be on inflation variability in both
cases.
11 Finally, the term in interest rate changes is mainly introduced to avoid extreme and counterfactual
interest rate volatility under the optimal policies. Various arguments such as a desire to avoid hitting the
lower zero bound or financial stability considerations could be used to justify a concern for interest rate
volatility. As a benchmark we will assume equal weights on output gap and inflation variability
( 5 . 0 1   ) and a relatively small weight ( 1 . 0 2   ) on changes in interest rates.
12 
Charts 3 and 4 show how the efficiency frontier shifts when the inflation and investment persistence
parameters shift from a low to a high value. In each case we calculate two efficiency frontiers. The first
one is derived by optimising the loss function for various relative weights on inflation and the output gap
under the assumption that the central bank follows a simple Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing.
The second one is derived under the assumption that the central bank implements the fully optimal
commitment rule that maximises loss function (10). Not surprisingly, the efficiency frontier under the
fully optimal commitment rule lies closer to the origin than the one under a simple Taylor rule with
interest rate smoothing. The loss associated with constraining the central bank to follow a simple policy
rule is, however, generally not very large. 
Focusing on how the efficiency frontiers shift as nominal and real persistence increases, two features are
worth highlighting. First, not surprisingly given the results in Section 3, the efficiency frontiers shift out
most in the case of increasing inflation persistence (Chart 3). The outward shift due to higher investment
persistence is very limited (Chart 4). From a macro-economic stabilisation point of view, nominal
                                                     
11  See Amato and Laubach (2002) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) for a fully model-consistent welfare analysis of
monetary policy in a simple version of the New-Keynesian model with inflation persistence. Amato and Laubach (2002) find
that the welfare loss from not modifying the loss function appropriately is quite small. 
12  A model-based welfare criterion would also determine the weights on the various terms. Here we follow the general practice
in the literature (see, for example, Taylor, 1999).	
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persistence therefore appears to be much more costly than real persistence. Second, the slope of the
efficiency frontier becomes flatter with increasing inflation persistence, while it tends to become steeper
with increasing output persistence. The policy implications of a change in the degree of persistence can be
most easily seen by looking at the impact of higher persistence on the optimised coefficients in the Taylor
rule with interest rate smoothing reported in Table 2. Higher inflation persistence increases the optimised
reaction coefficient to inflation from a relatively small number of 0.07 to a more significant number of
0.47, while the coefficient on the output gap falls from 0.51 to 0.33. The intuition for this result is quite
straightforward: as the inflation process becomes harder to control it becomes more important for the
central bank to respond promptly to increases in inflation. In contrast, the opposite happens when the
degree of output persistence increases: the reaction coefficient to inflation falls from 0.23 to 0.18, while
the coefficient on the output gap increases from 0.40 to 0.47. 
A common feature of all the optimised Taylor rules reported in Table 2 is the substantial degree of
interest rate smoothing. In all cases, the coefficient on the lagged interest rate hovers around one,
typically being somewhat larger than one. This is in line with Woodford’s (2001) finding that optimal
policies under commitment usually exhibit (super-) inertial behaviour. It also mirrors Amato and
Laubach’s (2002) finding that this feature is robust to different degrees of rule-of-thumb behaviour. The
robustness of first-difference Taylor-type rules was also noted by Williams (1999), Levin et al. (1999,
2001), Orphanides and Williams (2002) and Coenen (2002), amongst others.
The fully optimal commitment rule is more difficult to interpret as it is a much more complicated function
of the underlying state of the economy. In order to get a better sense of the difference between the various
policy rules, Charts 5 to 8 plot the optimal nominal and real interest rate response to a selected set of
shocks under the policy rule estimated in the Smets-Wouters model (equation (9)), the optimised Taylor
rule and the fully optimal commitment rule. The most striking result is that, with the exception of the
cost-push shock, the historically estimated interest rate response to the various supply and demand shocks
is always much smaller than those under the optimal policies. As a result the output gap and inflation
respond much stronger to the various shocks, explaining the overall higher volatility under the estimated
rule compared to the optimal policies. The most striking example is given in Chart 6, which depicts the
response to a preference shock. While the impact effect on the nominal interest rate is quite similar in all
cases, the interest rate response is much more hump-shaped under the optimal policies. This helps in
closing the output gap and stabilising inflation. A second common finding is that in general the interest
rate response under the optimised Taylor rule is quite close to the response under the fully optimal
commitment rule. 
By way of example, Charts 9 to 12 compare the optimal policy response under commitment to a
productivity shock and to a price mark-up shock under different degrees of inflation persistence (Charts 9
and 11) and investment persistence (Charts 10 and 12). Output persistence does not appear to give rise to
large changes in the response of the economy to shocks. The outcome for inflation and the output gap are
very similar under different degrees of investment persistence (Chart 10), although the required nominal
and real interest rate response is somewhat stronger when the economy is characterised by greater	
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investment persistence. Increased inflation persistence does lead to a more volatile and protracted
response of inflation and in the case of the cost-push shock also the output gap. For example, Chart 11
illustrates that higher inflation persistence does lead to a higher output cost of stabilising inflation
following a price mark-up shock.  
5.  Persistence and robust monetary policy
Finally, given the conceptual and empirical uncertainty regarding the structural persistence parameters
highlighted in the introduction, in this section we examine robust monetary policy in the face of such
uncertainty. Tables 3 and 4 report the main results for the optimised simple rules and the optimal policies
under commitment respectively. For both inflation and investment persistence, those tables report the
maximum and the mean (absolute and relative) regret or opportunity loss (i.e. the absolute and relative
difference in loss compared to the optimal policy
13) that the central bank would experience if it were to
implement optimal policy under the assumption of a given degree of persistence. For each degree of
persistence that the policy maker assumes when formulating its policy, the maximum and the mean are
calculated over all possible values of the true degree of persistence. A robust policy is then the policy that
minimises the maximum or mean regret. 
There are a number of interesting findings. First, the results confirm the analysis of Coenen (2002) that
the policy rules obtained under the assumption of high inflation persistence (and which respond more
aggressively to inflation) are more robust than those obtained under low inflation persistence. The cost of
assuming that inflation can be controlled quite easily through the expectation channel when in fact
inflation is significantly backward looking is quite high. An analysis of the various components of the
loss function shows indeed that the main cost is in terms of a higher variance of inflation. This is true both
for the simple policy rules and the optimal commitment policies. In contrast to Coenen (2002) who
compares two models (featuring Taylor-type contracts (close to  0  p  ) versus Fuhrer-Moore-type
contracts (close to  1  p  )), our analysis also allows for the intermediate cases. We find that, if the
policy maker wants to minimise the maximum regret, he or she should assume a degree of inflation
persistence equal to 0.8. Under this policy, the maximum opportunity loss is quite small. It will only be
2.6 percent higher than under the optimal policy, which would assume a much more forward-looking
inflation process. In this case, also the mean opportunity loss will only be 1.4 percent.
14 In contrast,
implementing policies that assume a highly forward-looking Phillips curve may result in much higher
relative losses (15.6 percent) when in reality inflation turns out to be significantly backward looking.
Second, uncertainty about investment persistence does not appear to be problematic from a robustness
point of view. None of the rules gives rise to very large losses, which is not very surprising given the
findings in Sections 3 and 4. 
                                                     
13  That is, the one the central bank would implement if it knew the true degree of persistence.
14  As shown in Table 3, the mean opportunity loss could be further reduced to 0.9 percent by assuming that the degree of




Finally, the robustness exercise regarding the optimal commitment policies (Table 4) shows that those
policies are generally more robust than the simple Taylor-type policy rules, confirming Svensson’s (2002)
conjecture that targeting rules are more robust. The relative robustness of optimal commitment rules can
potentially also explain why Amato and Laubach (2002) and Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) find that
optimal policies derived in a simple forward-looking New-Keynesian model also work reasonably well in
the more backward-looking versions of that model.     
6.  Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the implications of structural inflation and output persistence for the
transmission of shocks and for optimal monetary policy in an estimated DSGE model of the euro area.
Given the uncertainty regarding both the conceptual underpinnings and the empirical importance of
structural persistence in inflation and output, our ultimate focus was to analyse the robustness of various
monetary policies in the face of this uncertainty. Our main findings in this regard are as follows. First, we
find that uncertainty about the degree of output persistence presents much smaller problems for monetary
policy-makers than uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence. In particular, it is found that
optimal monetary policies appear to be less sensitive to different degrees of output persistence. By
contrast, when there is uncertainty about the degree of inflation persistence, we find that it is better for
policy-makers to work under the assumption that the economy is characterised by a relatively high degree
of inflation persistence because the costs of making a mistake when the inflation process in reality is less
persistent are not as high as making the reverse mistake. This finding confirms the results in Coenen
(2002). Second, while a similar tendency is found for optimised simple rules and optimal commitment
policies, we find that the latter are generally more robust than the former. It would be interesting to
analyse what feature of these policies makes them more robust. For this it would be necessary to
characterise the optimal policy rules under commitment more explicitly, such as proposed by Giannoni
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Chart 1: The effects of a monetary policy shock under different degrees of inflation persistence































Chart 2: The effects of a monetary policy shock under different degrees of investment persistence


































Chart 3: Efficiency frontiers under different degrees of inflation persistence

















Variance of inflation 
Chart 4: Efficiency frontiers under different degrees of investment persistence



















Notes: H: high persistence; M: medium persistence; L: low persistence; x-axis: variability of inflation; y-
axis: variability of output gap.	
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Chart 5: Estimated and optimal monetary policy responses to a productivity shock

































Chart 6: Estimated and optimal monetary policy responses to a preference shock

































Chart 7: Estimated and optimal monetary policy responses to a price mark-up shock
































Chart 8: Estimated and optimal monetary policy responses to an equity premium shock



































Chart 9: Optimal monetary policy responses to a productivity shock under different degrees of inflation
persistence

































Chart 10: Optimal monetary policy responses to a productivity shock under different degrees of
investment persistence





































Chart 11: Optimal monetary policy responses under commitment to a price mark-up shock under different
degrees of inflation persistence 






























Chart 12: Optimal monetary policy responses under commitment to a price mark-up shock under different
degrees of investment persistence



































Table A: Parameter estimates of the SWEAR model (Smets and Wouters, 2003).
Prior distribution Estimated maximum posterior Posterior distribution MH
type mean st. error mode st.error (Hessian) 5% median 95%   mean
 productivity shock inv gamma 0.4 2 * 0.598 0.113 0.469 0.624 0.874 0.639
inflation obj. shock inv gamma 0.02 2 * 0.017 0.008 0.012 0.025 0.085 0.033
cons.pref. shock inv gamma 0.2 2 * 0.336 0.096 0.237 0.392 0.631 0.407
gov.spending shock inv gamma 0.3 2 * 0.325 0.026 0.292 0.333 0.385 0.335
labour supply shock inv gamma 1.00 2 * 3.520 1.027 2.313 3.674 5.845 3.818
investment shock inv gamma 0.10 2 * 0.085 0.030 0.060 0.105 0.196 0.113
interest rate shock inv gamma 0.10 2 * 0.081 0.023 0.060 0.089 0.125 0.090
equity premium shock inv gamma 0.40 2 * 0.604 0.063 0.514 0.608 0.727 0.613
price mark-up shock inv gamma 0.15 2 * 0.160 0.016 0.140 0.164 0.197 0.165
wage mark-up shock inv gamma 0.25 2 * 0.289 0.027 0.256 0.295 0.346 0.297
 productivity shock beta 0.85 0.10 0.823 0.065 0.697 0.815 0.910 0.811
 inflation obj. shock beta 0.85 0.10 0.924 0.088 0.658 0.865 0.970 0.855
 cons.pref. shock beta 0.85 0.10 0.855 0.035 0.772 0.842 0.894 0.838
 gov. spending shock beta 0.85 0.10 0.949 0.029 0.900 0.945 0.977 0.943
 labour supply shock beta 0.85 0.10 0.889 0.052 0.773 0.891 0.952 0.881
 investment shock beta 0.85 0.10 0.927 0.022 0.864 0.913 0.946 0.910
investment adj cost Normal 4.00 1.5 6.771 1.026 5.148 6.920 8.898 6.962
consumption utility Normal 1.00 0.375 1.353 0.282 0.959 1.371 1.902 1.391
h consumption habit beta 0.70 0.10 0.573 0.076 0.464 0.595 0.713 0.592
labour utility Normal 2.00 0.75 2.400 0.589 1.603 2.491 3.481 2.503
fixed cost Normal 1.45 0.25 1.408 0.166 1.169 1.407 1.693 1.417
calvo employment beta 0.50 0.15 0.599 0.050 0.513 0.598 0.673 0.597
capital util. adj.cost Normal 0.20 0.075 0.169 0.075 0.062 0.175 0.289 0.201
calvo wages beta 0.75 0.05 0.737 0.049 0.662 0.742 0.824 0.742
calvo prices beta 0.75 0.05 0.908 0.011 0.888 0.905 0.922 0.905
indexation wages beta 0.75 0.15 0.763 0.188 0.455 0.745 0.930 0.728
indexation prices beta 0.75 0.15 0.469 0.103 0.309 0.472 0.670 0.477
r inflation Normal 1.70 0.10 1.684 0.109 1.526 1.688 1.844 1.688
r d(inflation) Normal 0.30 0.10 0.140 0.053 0.072 0.151 0.237 0.151
r lagged interest rate beta 0.80 0.10 0.961 0.014 0.932 0.958 0.974 0.956
r output-gap Normal 0.125 0.05 0.099 0.041 0.037 0.095 0.169 0.098
r d(output-gap) Normal 0.0625 0.05 0.159 0.027 0.119 0.156 0.201 0.158
* For the Inverted Gamma function the degrees of freedom are indicated.
Note: The model parameters used in this paper correspond to the mode of their posterior distribution
(column 4). The SWEAR model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. The first three columns report
the assumed prior distributions for each of the parameters. Columns 4 and 5 report the mode and a
proximate standard error of the posterior distribution. The last four columns report the 5, 50 and 95
percentiles and the mean of the posterior distribution sampled using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
See Smets and Wouters (2003) for further details. 	
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Table 1: Persistence and the transmission of shocks
Inflation persistence
Inflation Output gap
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Productivity -0.12 0.14 -0.17 0.45 0.46 0.48
124222
Inflation  target 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
359876
Preference 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.55 0.56 0.59
247333
Investment 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.10
358 1 0 98
Government 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09
248333
Labour supply -0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.53 -0.54 -0.56
247222
Equity premium 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.20 0.20
247111
Price mark-up 0.88 0.86 0.81 -0.08 -0.14 -0.33
111669
Wage mark-up 0.08 0.09 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10
1 2 4 17 15 15




Low Medium High Low Medium High
Productivity -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.43 -0.46 -0.46
222222
Inflation  target 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
555346
Preference 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.53 0.56 0.56
444233
Investment 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10
444247
Government 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08
444223
Labour supply -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.53 -0.55 -0.54
444222
Equity premium 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.24 0.22
233111
Price mark-up 0.86 0.86 0.86 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14
111446
Wage mark-up 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
2 2 2 11 11 14
Monetary policy -0.25 -0.26 -0.27 -0.44 -0.49 -0.48
444335
Note: Each entry gives the peak effect (in absolute value) of the various (one standard deviation)
shocks on inflation and the output gap. The number below indicates the timing of the peak effect (in
quarters following the shock). Low, medium and high persistence refers to a parameter value of
respectively 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. 	
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Table 2: Persistence and optimal Taylor rules with interest rate smoothing
Inflation persistence
p=0.1 p =0.2 p =0.3 p =0.4 p =0.5 p =0.6 p =0.7 p =0.8 p =0.9
Inflation 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.47
Output gap 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.33
Lagged int. rate 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Investment persistence 
hI=0.1 hI=0.2 hI=0.3 hI=0.4 hI=0.5 hI=0.6 hI=0.7 hI=0.8 hI=0.9
Inflation 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18
Output gap 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.47
Lagged int. rate 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00
Note: The numbers refer to the optimal reaction coefficients to current inflation, the output gap and the
lagged interest rate in a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing.	
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Table 3 – Persistence and the robustness of simple policy rules
Inflation persistence
p=0.1 p =0.2 p =0.3 p =0.4 p =0.5 p =0.6 p =0.7 p =0.8 p =0.9
Max relative regret 15.6 14.5 13.0 11.1 8.7 6.0 3.3 2.6* 5.3
Max regret 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01* 0.03
Mean rel. regret 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.9* 1.4 3.2
Mean regret 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.02
Investment  persistence
hI=0.1 hI=0.2 hI=0.3 hI=0.4 hI=0.5 hI=0.6 hI=0.7 hI=0.8 hI=0.9
Max relative regret 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.20 0.11* 0.22 0.40
Max regret 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00
Mean rel. regret 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04* 0.05 0.10 0.22
Mean regret 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The optimised simple rule is a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. A “*” refers to the
minimum of the maximum (mean) regret.	
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Table 4 – Persistence and the robustness of optimal commitment policies
Inflation persistence
p=0.1 p =0.2 p =0.3 p =0.4 p =0.5 p =0.6 p =0.7 p =0.8 p =0.9
Max rel. regret 6.6 5.9 5.1 4.2 3.3 2.3 1.3 0.7* 1.0
Max regret 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00* 0.00
Mean rel. regret 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3* 0.4 0.7
Mean regret 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Investment  persistence
hI=0.1 hI=0.2 hI=0.3 hI=0.4 hI=0.5 hI=0.6 hI=0.7 hI=0.8 hI=0.9
Max rel. regret 0.58 0.52 0.44 0.35 0.25 0.15* 0.19 0.28 0.38
Max regret 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean rel. regret 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.06* 0.07 0.12 0.18
Mean regret 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
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